The Summer 2015 issue of the Coast Guard publication Proceedings is now available at this link. This issue is titled “Improving Mariner Situational Awareness” and addresses the growing role of technology on the bridge of a vessel and the various skill levels found on the many types of vessels found on our nation’s waterways. This publication will provide you with insights into the Coast Guard’s vision for improving navigational safety in the United States.
The Trailer for the movie “The Finest Hours” has been released. This movie is about the historic rescue by the Coast Guard of the crew of the tanker PENDLETON during a storm in 1952. I understand that the movie will be released in early 2016.
Coast Guard marine safety personnel in Alaska performed community outreach over a 3 week period beginning at the end of May. During this period they conducted 412 dockside safety examinations of commercial fishing vessels and issued 354 compliance decals to vessels that passed the exam.
I have been very concerned about the number of commercial fishing vessels that may not have a compliance decal by the October 15, 2015 deadline. This type of community outreach goes a long way to addressing that concern.
Any fishing vessel owner who would like to schedule a dockside exam can get the necessary information at the Coast Guard’s web site: www.fishsafe.info Better yet – get all the boats in your harbor to schedule a period for the Coast Guard to conduct these exams at the same time!
If you would like to see what the requirements are for your particular type of commercial fishing vessel, the Coast Guard has created a checklist generator for you at this site: Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Checklist Generator
More information regarding the success of the Coast guard’s community outreach dockside exams can be found at this link.
Way to Go TEAM COAST GUARD!
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation today voted to send to the full Senate a bill that will result in the deaths of more fishermen on vessels that capsize and sink at sea.
Section 312 of S. 1611, Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015, as ordered reported from the Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, amends the requirement Congress enacted in 2010 that requires commercial fishing vessels built after 1 July 2013 that are over 50-feet and operate more than 3-miles from the coast to be designed, built and maintained to the standards of a recognized organization – called a class society. The amendment proposed in S. 1611 would eliminate that requirement for fishing vessels over 50-feet but less than 190-feet.
According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), commercial fishing has the highest rate of deaths of any industry in the United States. The 2010 safety requirements were designed to change that historical record.
This provision is immoral. A Committee in Congress has never voted in the past 30 years to decrease safety standards for the commercial fishing industry. Clearly the voice of vessel owners was heard today – but what of the voice of the workers on these vessels. Apparently the deaths of fishermen killed in disasters such as the ARCTIC ROSE, KATMAI, ALASKA RANGER and MAJESTIC BLUE are not enough to convince Senators that the old way of building vessels without 3rd party oversight is not enough.
This is a serious issue that should be beyond politics and lobbiest. This is not an amendment to make more fishing vessels eligible for Federal loans and loan guarantees like they have also done in this bill. This provision will decide whether fishermen come home to their families or whether they will be lost at sea as so many have been in the past.
The Senators that voted on this bill are aware of the dismal safety history of the fishing industry. This legislation will allow fishing vessels to be designed, and the construction overseen, by people who are not qualified – the same has been done for the past 85 years. Fishermen will die to save the vessel owners money by eliminating any effective oversight by an independent party of the design, construction and maintenance of fishing vessels.
Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA) voiced her concern about the fishing vessel safety provisions contained in S. 1611. She stated that 68% of the deaths on the West Coast were from major fishing vessel casualties and that between 2000 and 2009 there were 32 fishing vessel disasters resulting in 58 deaths including 24 deaths in the Bering Sea. She stated that “I want to make sure that we get vessel safety correct”. The provisions in S. 1611 are far from being correct.
The Pacific Northwest and Alaska are not the only regions to have fishing vessel disasters. In the Gulf of Mexico there were 27 fishing vessel disasters between 2000 and 2009 resulting in the deaths of 39 fishermen and on the East Coast there were 59 fishing vessel disasters resulting in 98 deaths.
For more detailed information on this provision read by article titled “Death on the High Seas”.
This Norwegian video uses humor to educate people about the dangers of drinking alcohol and boating.
My friend Dennis Bryant (USCG-Ret) published an article on MarineLink.com titled “Marine Casualty Reporting: Addressing the Coast Guard’s Processes” in which he discusses the current broken state of the Coast Guard’s marine casualty reporting and investigation system. I agree with Dennis that the system is broken – and has been for years.
In his article Dennis states:
“The Coast Guard is drowning in marine casualty reports. The majority of its informal investigations are never closed. Those that are closed are seldom read again. Lessons that might have been learned from marine casualties are rarely shared with the maritime industry. It is time to go back to basics.”
Therefore, Dennis recommends that the types of accidents and injuries reported to the Coast Guard be scaled back and that sector commanders be given broad latitude to decide which casualties should be investigated.
Dennis also states that “In my opinion, there are far too many informal investigations and they generally provide no lessons learned.” If an investigation provides no less learned – then perhaps it is the fault of the investigator, the investigator’s training, and the quality of the report that has been prepared. The major purpose of these types of investigations is not to suspend or revoke the license of a mariner who may have made a mistake – but to learn from the casualty so that future accidents can be prevented and to help ensure that Coast Guard regulations are adequately addressing the root causes of a casualty.
Perhaps the Coast Guard should gather more information about a casualty – not just “data” about time, place, and who was involved. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has delved into the Coast Guard’s casualty reports and prepared an excellent analysis of casualties and injuries on commercial fishing vessels. This information is then made publicly available at their site (see link). The Coast Guard has also used this information to help identify problems in the fishing vessel industry. However, I understand that the data in the casualty reports were not particularly helpful in identifying the types of problems that should be addressed for towing vessels under the new Subchapter M regulations.
Congress agreed with Dennis that marine casualty reports should be made available to the public. Section 442 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 amended section 6101(i) of title 46, United States Code States to require that:
“(i) The Secretary shall, as soon as possible, and no later than January 1, 2005, publish all marine casualty reports prepared in accordance with this section in an electronic form.”
As Dennis points out, there were problems with privacy sensitive information being contained in certain data fields that should not be released (names, phone numbers, social security numbers, etc). This made automation of the publishing of these reports a challenge. The Coast Guard scrubbed that information to ensure no privacy information was released and now makes all marine casualty reports available on line at: Incident Investigation Reports. The public and insurers can search this database based on the vessel’s name, owner, or other key words. It will also help the public see the quality of the investigation.
There are problems with the Coast Guard’s marine casualty reporting and investigation system – but the solution is not to give sector commanders broad discretion to decide what should and should not be investigated. That lack of national uniformity will make the consistent gathering of casualty information impossible and of little value to those trying to use the information for regulatory purposes. A sector commander may not have any background in maritime safety and decide to allocate the limited sector resources to other purposes.
Much of the reporting that Dennis is concerned about is comparable to occupational safety reports other industries must submit regarding workplace injuries to agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). However, OSHA does not generally have jurisdiction on Coast Guard inspected vessels – so this type of information is collected by the agency with jurisdiction – the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard is drowning due to all types of resource constraints and it is affecting many programs – not just casualty investigations. If the Coast Guard does not have the resources necessary to collect the information necessary to prevent future casualties – the solution isn’t to stop gathering the information. Perhaps the solution is to give this responsibility to a different federal agency that can perform this responsibility.
|Issue: Commercial fishing vessel owners are seeking to eliminate the requirement for independent 3rd party review of the design, construction, and maintenance of fishing vessels by classification societies.|
According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), commercial fishing has the highest rate of death of any industry in the United States. For years the Coast Guard had requested authority to “inspect” fishing vessels the same as they inspect most other types of commercial vessels (see 46 U.S.C. 3301). To address design, construction and maintenance of commercial without a formal Coast Guard “inspection”, section 604 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 required all commercial fishing vessels over 50 feet in length that travel beyond 3 miles from shore to be designed, constructed, and maintained to class standards.
Class societies were started to help insurers manage their risk – so the insurers would know the quality of the ship covered by their policy. No Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club or insurance company should underwrite these multimillion dollar ships without managing their risk by requiring them to be designed, built, and maintained to class standard. According to DNV GL, the objective of their class society is the “safeguarding of life, property and the environment.”
The class society standards include the structural design of the vessel, engine standards, propulsion systems, steering and rudder systems, and piping systems for the bilge, fuel, and cold water cooling. The class societies also require that welders that build the vessel meet minimum qualification standards – so the vessel will not break apart while at sea.
Naval architects and engineers that design and oversee the construction of commercial fishing vessels are required to submit their plans for approval by a class society and the class society monitors the construction of the vessel as an independent 3rd party to ensure that the vessel was in fact built to class society standards. Congress believed that class society standards could be more flexible in addressing the different operating environments for fishing vessels than Coast Guard inspection standards have been historically– so that a shrimp boat in the Gulf of Mexico would not have to meet the same standards as a fishing vessel in the Bering Sea.
Opposition to class society standards:
Opposition to the classing requirement has come from vessel owners that fish in Alaska.
Section 312 of the S. 1611, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015, as introduced, eliminates all requirements for the designed, construction, and maintenance of commercial fishing vessels that are less than 190 feet to be reviewed and approved an independent party with expertise in the field of fishing vessel construction – a class society. Instead, S. 611 allows any registered professional hired by a vessel owner to design the fishing vessel as long as it is overseen by a marine surveyor hired by the vessel owner. This is the same type of construction process that has gone on in the United States for over 100 years – and has caused the deaths of thousands of fishermen.
Specific provisions in S. 1611
Let’s look at the specific language contained in S. 1611.
Section 312 states that the classing requirement does not apply if –
“(C) the vessel is designed by a registered professional engineer, and the design incorporates standards equivalent to those prescribed by a classification society approved under section 3316 of this title or another qualified organization approved by the Secretary; and
“(D) construction of such vessel is overseen and certified as being in accordance with its design by a marine surveyor of an organization approved by the Secretary.”
Who is a “registered professional engineer”? They are engineers that are certified by an organization such as the National Association of Professional Engineers. I recently hired a professional engineer to review and certify beam specifications that were to be installed during a remodel of my home. While that engineer may have been qualified to perform that task – he has never designed a vessel of any type and is not qualified to do so. He has received no training in hull design, machinery, propulsion systems, stability, lifesaving equipment, or firefighting systems that are for a vessel. In fact, he was not qualified to design my house – for that I had to hire an architect. Being a registered professional engineer does not mean that the individual can design a vessel that will be safe at sea.
Similarly, the design plan for the remodeling of my house had to be reviewed by an independent 3rd party – in this case the county permitting office – who found several mistakes in the blueprints prepared by the architect.
Clause (C) also states that the design “incorporates standards equivalent to those prescribed by a classification society”. Who is to make that determination? The engineer? The Secretary? Different class societies may have different standards – but when you examine the vessel as a whole – it provides a safe vessel. What if the engineer takes a piping system that is approved by one class society and tries to hook it up to a fuel system approved by a different class society? It may not be safe.
One may say, “let’s require the vessel to be designed by a registered naval architect instead of a registered professional engineer.” The problem is that there is no organization that registers or certifies the training and qualifications of naval architects. I can join a professional organization of naval architects – even if I’m not a naval architect. For example, they may allow marine surveyors to join their organization. There are no tests to determine the actual skills and knowledge of the individual to design a ship. Naval architects can also make mistakes, as I previously mentioned regarding my house remodeling. Even if the bill were to require the ship to be designed by a naval architect (if there were a system to determine the qualifications for such an architect) – it needs to be reviewed by an independent 3rd party.
It takes many skills to design a safe ship including naval architects, engineers of many types (such as structural and electrical engineers), and experts in lifesaving and fire protection. The fishing vessel owners are simply trying to save money by not having to hire a classification society – while providing the mirage of safety by having certified engineer design the ship – even if that individual isn’t qualified.
Clause (D) requires the construction of the vessel to be overseen by a marine surveyor and that the surveyor certify that the vessel is in accordance with the design. I’ve hired marine surveyors – such as when I bought my boat. He did an excellent job at what he did – in reporting the condition of the boat. That does not mean he is qualified to oversee the construction of a ship in a shipyard. The Coast Guard allows some marine surveyors to examine commercial fishing vessels to make sure that they have the required safety equipment on board – such as personal flotation devices (PFDs), Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs), immersion suits, adequate survival craft, visual distress signals, and radio equipment. That does not mean they are qualified to examine the welds on a ship to ensure that the rudder doesn’t fall off.
The commercial fishing vessel owners that are attempting to eliminate the classing requirement are building multi-million dollar ships. For example, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, in addition to requiring classing, removed the prohibition on vessel replacement under the American Fisheries Act. This was done with the agreement that the new vessels would be built to class. The amendment abrogates that agreement by allowing new vessels into this fishery that are not built to minimum safety standards established by an approved class society. The owners of the vessels in this limited entry fishery will make millions of dollars while putting the lives of the fishing vessel crews and the men and women of the Coast Guard at risk.
What is particularly galling is that section 311 of S. 1611 will subsidize the construction of these unsafe vessels with Federal loans and loan guarantees. The Federal Government should ensure that the asset that they are going to provide a loan or loan guarantee is safe and doesn’t end up at the bottom of the ocean.
This provision will lead to the death of commercial fishermen.
The Senate provision –
- Eliminates the requirement for 3rd party review and inspection of the design, construction and maintenance of commercial fishing vessels.
- Eliminates the certification of welders as required by class societies.
- Eliminates any uniformity of standards by allowing each professional engineer to establish their owner standards that they consider “equivalent” to class society standards. for their client – the shipowner.
- Allows professional engineers and marine surveyors that do not have any training and expertise in the design, construction, and maintenance of commercial fishing vessels to undertake those responsibilities on behalf of the shipowner who is trying to cut costs.
Some owners of commercial fishing vessels believe that class societies charge too much – and that they can build safe vessels without having to pay for independent safety oversight. According to a recent article in the Seattle Times titled “Bills seek to modify fishing-vessel safety law”, DNV GH has estimated that the cost of classing a commercial fishing vessel will increase by $30-40,000 – a small price given the multi-million dollar cost of these ships. The history of the commercial fishing industry demonstrates that vessel owners are not ship designers and do not have the skills necessary to oversee the naval architects and engineers that are designing and building their vessels.
Illustrations of commercial fishing vessel disasters:
The history of commercial fishing vessel industry is filled with disasters and loss of life that prove them wrong. Many of these casualties have been caused by insufficient design, construction, repair, and maintenance.
Let’s look at some of the major commercial fishing vessel casualties and consider whether the Senate provision would address these casualties.
- ARCTIC ROSE – sank on April 2, 2001 in the Bering Sea killing all 15 crewmembers. After deep sea excursion to the ARCTIC ROSE, the Coast Guard believed that this disaster was caused by a crewmember leaving a watertight door open and a flawed design that allowed water to pour in. Of course, why was the door left open in April in the Bering Sea? Inadequate ventilation may have made it too hot down below for the crewmembers to be comfortable. There was no 3rd party review of the design and construction to ensure that the design of the vessel was adequate, including a proper ventilation system.
- AMERICUS – on February 14, 1983 the AMERICUS and ALTAIR were found floating with their hulls bottom up. The 14 crewmen died. The Coast Guard found that these disasters were probably caused by alterations to these vessels that increased their weight – without recalculating the impact of those alterations on the vessel’s stability. The “independent marine surveyor” had examined the vessels stability letters but did not “examine them to ensure they were up to date”. The testimony of that surveyor stated that the responsibility for the stability letters rested with the naval architect. No 3rd party reviews by a class society were done during of the extensive alteration made to the vessel.
- MAJESTIC BLUE – sank on June 14, 2010 killing 2 crewmembers. The Coast Guard report stated “The proximate cause of this sinking was the rapid intrusion of sea water into the steering compartment through an unknown breach or breaches in the hull envelope of approximately 106 – 176 square inches. The recent shipyard repair work and hull survey was not under CG oversight therefore no documentary evidence is available regarding the outer structural integrity of the hull and or quality of repairs.” Similarly, that shipyard repair work was not done under the supervision of a class society. The Formal Investigation recommended that, “The Coast Guard should seek legislative authority and additional resources to support a mandatory annual inspection program for Commercial Fishing Vessels to include a dry-dock examination. The Commandant “concurred with the intent of this recommendation” stating “I agree that commercial fishing vessels should be subject to inspection. The Coast Guard has submitted legislative change proposals (LCPs) for such authority numerous times, however, the requests have not been accepted or approved in the legislative process.”
- KATMAI – sank on October 21, 2008 killing 7 crewmembers. The Coast Guard investigation stated that “The most likely cause of the flooding was a catastrophic failure of the vessel’s hull or in sea water supply piping.” Once again, there was no 3rd party oversight of the design or maintenance and repair of the KATMAI by a 3rd party class society.
- ALASKA RANGER – sank March 23, 2008 killing 5 crewmembers. The Coast Guard report indicates that it was probably caused by progressive flooding which started in the rudder room. Press reports indicated that the rudder may have fallen off the ship. Obviously, rudders should not leak or fall off a ship. No 3rd party oversight of the design or maintenance and repair of this vessel was conducted by a class society. The Formal Investigation recommend that, “The Commandant should review and revise the comprehensive commercial fishing vessel inspection plan proposed in 1992, and, again, request the additional legislative authority and resources necessary to implement an inspection program. This inspection program should include mandatory, regular inspections”. The Commandant ‘concurred with this recommendation.”
As described in the casualty report of the crab boats ALTAIR and AMERICUS the marine surveyor indicated that the naval architect was responsible for …. But the stability calculations were not done after the alterations were made to these 2 boats – and 16 lives were lost.
Commercial fishing vessels used to be inspected by the Coast Guard
Longtime fishing safety advocate Richard Hiscock has these thoughts and historical perspective on the proposals in House and Senate Coast Guard Authorization bills (H. 1987 and S. 1611) to make drastic changes to the requirement to build and maintain new fishing vessels to recognized standards.
“Any change in the current requirement that newly constructed fishing vessels over 50-feet overall in length be built and maintained to recognized standards would yet another in a long ‘tragedy of missed opportunities.’”
“Fishing vessels today are ‘uninspected’, but it wasn’t always that way. In the days of steam propulsion fishing vessels were inspected, and required to have a full complement of licensed officers, including a radio operators (I know because my father was a radio operator on beam-trawlers out of Boston).
“In the 1930’s when fishing vessels transitioned to diesel propulsion Congress failed to keep pace with changing technology, and fishing (and towing) vessel became ‘uninspected.’”
On September 30, 2010 the Seattle Times ran an article titled “Bill OK’d to overhaul fishing-industry safety, protect Sound” in which Senator Cantwell states “It has been nearly four years in the making to get this important legislation through Congress,” (referring to the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010”). A subsequent Seattle Times opinion article published on October 4, 2010 titled “New Federal Rules Seek End to Deadliest Harvest” congratulated Senator Cantwell on her efforts to improve commercial fishing vessel safety. The article concluded:
“Cantwell stayed focus from start to finish, authoring sections of the bill and working to get the package passed into law. Lives will be saved because of her efforts.”
Senator Cantwell should ensure that this major commercial fishing vessel safety measure that required 3rd party oversight over the design, construction, and maintenance of fishing vessels is not eviscerated.
On March 22, 1990, the commercial fishing vessel ALEUTIAN ENTERPRISE capsized and sank on a calm day in the Bering Sea killing 9 crewmembers. However, in 1989 Congressman John Miller (R-WA) intervened with the Coast Guard asking them to delay requiring the vessel to have a loadline. Such an inspection would have required alterations to the vessel to address the watertight integrity of the vessel. The Coast Guard agreed to the delay the order so that it could be further reviewed. During that review the disaster occurred. A November 1990 Associated Press article titled “Could boat tragedy been avoided?” quoted a father of one of the deceased crewman as saying “’Why in the hell Miller got involved in that is beyond me … I’d like his role explained.”
When these commercial fishing vessels disasters continue, I would like the role of the Senators who are pushing for this change to be explained.
Safety does cost money – and the history of the commercial fishing industry demonstrates that many owners do not have the expertise to oversee the design, construction, and maintenance of their fishing vessels and are not willing to spend the money it takes to have an independent 3rd party such as a class society perform this work.
The Senate should reject any proposal to change the requirement that commercial fishing vessels over 50 feet be designed, constructed, and maintained to class society standards that are overseen by the class society. This independent 3rd party review is vital to improving the safety on commercial fishing vessels in the United States.
Insurers should also require, as a condition of their policy, that commercial fishing vessels over 50 feet in length be built and maintained to class standards to better manage their risk.
Below is a list of commercial fishing vessels that have been built to class since 2012:
U.S.-flag fishing vessels built to class
|Shipyard||FV owner||Name/# FV||Type of FV||Length||Classed by||Year built|
|Eastern Shipbuilding (FL)||O’Hara Corp.||ARAHO (#175)||trawler||194’||DNV GL||2015|
|Kvichak||Norton Sound Economic Development Corporation||Paul C. Johnson||Salmon/crab||67’4”||RINA||2014|
|Dakota Creek Shipbuilding||Blue North||Blue North||Cod longliner||191.5’||2014|
|Dakota Creek Shipbuilding||Fishermen’s Finest||Fishermen’s Finest||Catcher/processor groundfish||261’||DNV GL||2017|
|Vigor Alaska||Alaska Longline Co.||Arctic Prowler||Catcher/processor longline||136’||DNV GL||2013|
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada published a blog post by Glenn Budden, a Senior Investigator for their agency titled “Time to change maritime safety behavor” in the commercial fishing industry. His insights are particularly informative because Mr. Budden owned and operated a commercial fishing business.
Falling overboard is the second leading cause of deaths on commercial fishing vessels in Canada. In British Columbia, 40% of the individuals that died on a commercial fishing vessel since 2004 were not wearing a Personal Flotation Device (PFD) despite the fact that PFDs are legally required for individuals “employed under conditions which involve a risk of drowning.”
Mr. Budden uses the loss of life on the fishing vessel DIANE LOUISE to illustrate his point. The report on the DIANE LOUISE is at this link.
The key point that he makes is that commercial fishermen are keenly aware that they are engaged in a risky business – and they accept that risk – but in the case of the DIANE LOUISE they did not manage it.
Wearing a PFD on a commercial fishing vessel should become the normal practice. Just as I do not feel comfortable driving my car without my seat belt on – so to must crewmembers become uncomfortable going on deck without their PFD.
However, Mr. Budden correctly states that “Any efforts to improve safety and eliminate unsafe behaviours in commercial fishing have to be made in consideration of the difficult operating environment and must be tailored to work within that context”. In the United States that may mean that the type of a PFD that works for a fisherman in Alaska may not work for a fisherman in the Gulf of Mexico because it is just too hot.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has worked for several years to identify PFDs that fishermen will be comfortable using in various marine environments and some manufacturers have begun adapting their products for those regional conditions. I will write a blog on that topic in the near future.
This video demonstrates the effect of cold water on the human body – and why wearing a PFD is vital to any chance of survival in cold water.
This past weekend a passenger of the dinner cruise NORTHERN SPIRIT fell into Lake Ontario when he was leaning over the railing. The individual involved in this casualty was a trained lifeguard and expert swimmer. According to press reports, the police estimated that the water was approximately 9o C (48o F). Witnesses were watching him – until they could not see him.
Most people immediately think of hypothermia in cases such as this – but there are dangers that can occur far more quickly than hypothermia.
According to RADM Alan Steinman (USCG Ret) the cold shock response of the human body includes:
- Gasp Reflex
- Difficulty holding your breath
- Hypertension (elevated blood pressure)
Quick response is vital in situations such as this. Dr. Steinman’s summary of cold water risks indicates the following parameters for risks in cold water:
- Cold shock – (0-2 minutes)
- Functional disability (2-30 minutes)
- Hypothermia (greater than 30 minutes)
A more detailed article from CTV NEWS Toronto titled ‘I blinked and he was gone’: Lifeguard missing after falling overboard is at this link.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has announced (see link) they are deploying a team to gather information and assess the situation.